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I. INTRODUCTION
Two federally created lending institutions-the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) and the Farm Credit System (FCS)-to-
gether hold over forty percent of all agricultural loans in the United
States, a percentage that has declined in recent years from a level
which substantially exceeded half of all such loans in the early 1980s.1
Even at this reduced level, however, the FmHA and the Farm Credit
Services lenders exert a great deal of influence and control over agri-
cultural credit in general, and affect the availability and cost of credit,
as well as the flexibility of other lenders.
FmHA and FCS lenders have more in common than their deriva-
tion from federal law. They are both specifically directed and limited
in the scope of their lending by the federal legislation under which
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REmEw.
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they are created and maintained, they are closely regulated by an ex-
ecutive agency of the United States government, and they are both
subject to an intense level of political scrutiny and influence which
affects how, and how well, they serve their producer customers and
constituents.
At the same time, the programs differ a great deal as well. The
Farmers Home Administration is an agency within the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). It is funded with appropriations
of federal tax dollars-for both administrative costs and for its "direct"
lending programs-and is administered by political appointees and
career government employees within the USDA.2 The Farm Credit
System, on the other hand, is a network of federally-chartered and
regulated borrower-owned cooperative lending institutions.3 These
institutions are intended to raise their own operating and lending cap-
ital, although they were created with and have recently received infu-
sions of federal funds. They are managed and administered by
producer-elected directors and private employees, and they are clearly
not agencies of the United States government.
Effective representation of agricultural producers or lenders in-
volved with the FmHA or FCS requires an understanding of the his-
tory, purpose, structure, funding, and regulation of these lenders, as
well as case law that has evolved under federal legislation enacted
during the past decade. A brief discussion of these issues follows.
II. FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
The Farmers Home Administration is an agency within the United
States Department of Agriculture. The FmHA is authorized, among
other things, to make loans to farmers and ranchers for acquisition
and improvement of real estate, equipment and livestock used in agri-
cultural production, and for annual operating purposes. The FmHA's
purpose, as expressed by the Congress, is as follows:
Congress reaffirms the historical policy of the United States to foster and en-
courage the family farm system of agriculture in this country. Congress be-
lieves that the maintenance of the family farm system of agriculture is
essential to the social well-being of the Nation and the competitive production
of adequate supplies of food and fiber. Congress further believes that any sig-
nificant expansion of non-family owned large-scale corporate farming enter-
prises will be detrimental to the national welfare. It is neither the policy nor
the intent of Congress that agricultural and agriculture-related programs be
administered exclusively for family farm operations, but it is the policy and
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1921-2006 (1988). See James T. Massey, Farmers In Crisis: A Chal-
lenge to Legal Services, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 704 (1984).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001 to 2279aa-14 (1988). See James T. Massey & Susan A. Schnei-
der, Title I of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987: A Law in Search of Enforce-
ment, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 589 (1990).
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the express intent of Congress that no such program be administered in a
manner that will place the family farm at an unfair economic disadvantage.
4
Although the underlying purpose of the FmHA loan programs has
remained the same over several decades, those programs have been
substantially modified, redirected, and changed by acts of Congress,
by policies of several administrators, and by the federal courts. A
brief overview of the contemporary history of the agency helps to put
its current statutory and regulatory scheme in perspective.
A. The Pre-Coleman FmHA
During the 1970s, Congress appropriated a great deal of money for
the FmHA's farm loan programs.5 This was prompted by several
years of very serious drought-particularly in the South-and by an
executive and congressional policy attitude that supported substantial
involvement in agriculture. In the late 1970s, the Congress was also
spurred on by visions of enormous world markets, and an inflationary
spiral that was expected to carry commodity prices and land values to
levels commensurate with the huge wave of credit being advanced by
all agricultural lenders.6
The decade of the 1980s brought with it a sudden and radical shift
in the federal government's agricultural credit policies as well as in
the agricultural credit climate in general. First, the Reagan Adminis-
tration immediately sought in 1981 to restrict and cut back on FmHA
farm lending programs, as well as other governmental program
designed to assist farmers. 7 When the Administration was unsuccess-
ful in convincing Congress to substantially dismantle the FmHA-a
goal of the administration from the outset-the USDA instead began
a conscious and deliberate effort to restrict, undermine, or simply re-
fuse to implement the programs that had been enacted by the Con-
gress to assist financially distressed farmers and ranchers. At the
same time, the inflationary spiral of the late 1970s and early 1980s
continued unabated, but failed to lift up with it the price farmers re-
ceived for their agricultural commodities or, ultimately, the value of
their agricultural assets. Thus, the stage was set in the agricultural
economy for the "cost/price squeeze," a situation in which the cost of
producing agricultural commodities exceeded the price farmers re-
ceived in the market.
There emerged from these two phenomena-the financial and eco-
nomic crisis brought on by the cost/price squeeze in general, coupled
4. Congressional Reaffirmation of Policy to Foster and Encourage Family Farms;
Annual Report to Congress. 7 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (1988).
5. See, eg., Rural Development Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-419, 86 Stat. 657; Agri-
cultural Credit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-334, 92 Stat. 420.
6. HmAROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 256-57.
7. See Massey, supra note 2, at 712-13.
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with the administration's policy of withdrawing federal assistance
from farmers and ranchers-a true credit crisis for FmHA borrowers.
By the early 1980s, forty percent of FmHA's 250,000 borrowers had
become seriously delinquent on their loans.8 At the same time, the
value of their assets-particularly land and equipment-began a free-
fall descent which saw appraised and true market value of farm real
estate drop in some areas of the country to twenty to thiry percent of
its valuation just five years before.9 Although farmers and ranchers
could have expected the federal government to play a cushioning or
protective role in decades past, a role specifically directed in both pol-
icy and program language contained in FmHA's legislation, this was
not to be with the new Administration. Rather, the Administration
adopted aggressive and historically blind "delinquency reduction
goals" in 1981.10 These delinquency reductions were to be accom-
plished, according to the then Administrator of the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration, through "loan servicing," a euphemism for liquidations
and foreclosures, not through any form of loan forbearance, consolida-
tion, reamortization or restructuring of unsecured debt.11
Although there were many incidents and examples of the Adminis-
tration's policy during this period, two stand out as exemplary of the
Administration's conduct and as harbingers of the coming decade. In
1978, with a friendlier administration in the White House, Congress
had taken two very substantial steps toward assisting financially
troubled FmHA borrowers. First, Congress created the Limited Re-
source (LR) program under which the Secretary of Agriculture could
make FmHA real estate and operating loans at low, subsidized inter-
est rates to small and family size farmers. 12 This legislation was par-
ticularly significant in the late 1970s as market interest rates began
to creep upward to the double digit level. In the same year, and in the
same act, Congress enacted the "deferral statute." This statute
8. Massey, supra note 2, at 714.
9. KENNETH L. PEOPLES ET AL., ANATOMY OF AN AMERiCAN AGmCULTURAL CRErr
CRisis: FARM DEBT IN THE 1980s, at 25 (1992).
10. See Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 738 F.2d 1556 (11th
Cir. 1984); FmHA Sets Delinquency Reduction Goals, SMALL FAm ADVOCATE,
Winter 1981/1982, at 6. According to the article in the Small Farm Advocate, the
delinquency reduction plan was rumored to include both incentives and disincen-
tives for state directors. Those who achieved the goals, it was reported, might
expect more favorable job performance reports and promotion recommendations;
one source claimed that a salary bonus incentive was also part of the program.
The disincentives were said to include decreases of state FmHA allocations for
states not reaching the delinquency reduction goals. New delinquency reduction
goals were set by FmHA for 1982. Farmers Home Administration, Administra-
tive Notice No. 742, Aug. 20, 1982.
11. Farmers Home Administration, Administrative Notice No. 742, Aug. 20, 1982.
12. Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-334, 92 Stat. 420; 7 U.S.C. § 1934
(1988).
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granted the Secretary the authority to defer payments on FmHA
loans, and created a moratorium on particular foreclosure actions, in
cases in which an FmHA borrower was delinquent due to circum-
stances beyond his or her control.13 The Reagan Administration op-
posed implementation of both of these provisions.
With respect to the Limited Resource program, the Administra-
tion's initial strategy was to ask Congress to eliminate the entire pro-
gram in 1981 and 1982. This, Congress refused to do. When it failed
in the Congress, the Department of Agriculture accomplished admin-
istratively most of what it was unable to do legislatively, at least until
1984. Beginning in 1982, FmHA simply declined to spend a substan-
tial portion of the Limited Resource loan authority appropriated by
the Congress each year, notwithstanding quotas set in the legislation.
In 1982 alone, $120 million, or forty-six percent of the Limited Re-
source authority, went unspent and was lost at the end of the fiscal
year. In 1983, the results were similar. During 1982 and 1983, the
Administration declined to utilize subsidized loan assistance that
could have served over 10,000 average FmHA borrowers. During the
same period of time, the FmHA's rate of farm acquisition-through
"voluntary liquidation," foreclosure and bankruptcy-first doubled,
then tripled.4 In fiscal year 1982, 8,227 FmHA borrowers went out of
business.15 In 1983, that number was 7,529.16 Thus, while the farm-
ers whom Congress intended to assist with these programs were going
out of business, the Administration was refusing to act. Congress fi-
nally mandated in 1984 that the Administration utilize all of the
funds appropriated for the Limited Resource program.17
The Administration's refusal to implement the deferral statute led
initially to the federal courts, and not to Congress. Beginning in 1982,
a string of federal courts declared that the Secretary of Agriculture
had violated the 1978 Act by refusing to implement the deferral stat-
ute, and enjoined any agency farm loan liquidation or foreclosure of
FmHA loans until the statute was implemented.18 In one of these
cases, Coleman v. Block, fied initially as a North Dakota class action
and later enlarged to become a national class action encompassing vir-
13. 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988).
14. Massey, supra note 2, at 714 n.71.
15. Massey, supra note 2, at 716 n.85.
16. Massey, supra note 2, at 716 n.86.
17. Food & Agriculture Act of 1984, § 102, 7 U.S.C. § 2266 (1988).
18. Matzke v. Block, 732 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp.
1353 (D.N.D. 1983), 580 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.D. 1983), 580 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.D.
1984), 632 F. Supp. 997 (D.N.D. 1986), 663 F. Supp. 1315 (D.N.D. 1987), dis-
missed as moot, 864 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989);
Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 738 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir.
1984); Allison v. Block, 556 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 631 (8th
Cir. 1983).
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tually every state, the United States District Court issued several in-
junctions from 1983 through 1987 which virtually precluded any
FmHA liquidations or foreclosures of its borrowers during that period
of time. 19 The Coleman decisions also mandated notice and due pro-
cess procedures that were required to be implemented by the USDA
before it could foreclose on any FmHA borrowers, and before it could
refuse to release farm proceeds from the sale of crops or livestock in
which the United States held a security interest through the Farmers
Home Administration. 20 Both the pre-Coleman and Coleman deci-
sions laid the groundwork for the next decade of FmHA activity, in the
administration, the Congress, and the federal courts. A closer look at
the Coleman decisions identifies the context in which the legislation
evolved.
Following the landmark decision in Curry v. Block,21 the United
States District Court for North Dakota issued decisions in 1983 and
1984 which created a national class of FmHA borrowers, and issued
an injunction halting FmHA liquidations and foreclosures. 2 2 In the
Curry and Coleman decisions, the courts determined that FmHA bor-
rowers had a constitutionally protected property interest in their
FmHA loans and loan collateral, and that that property interest was
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 3 In
reaching that decision, the courts analogized the FmHA borrower's
status to that of a welfare or social security recipient, drawing on due
process cases that had established as early as 1970 that welfare recip-
ients have the right to the due process protections of notice, hearing,
and written decision, before the government terminates the welfare
benefits.
In the Curry!Coleman litigation, the courts determined that the
FmHA's procedure for accelerating, liquidating, and foreclosing its
loans offended fundamental notions of due process. First, a decision
was made by FmHA personnel to liquidate a loan.2 4 Second, a notice
was sent to the borrower indicating that that decision was made and,
effective immediately, the government had unilaterally terminated
the farmer's right to utilize any of his or her proceeds that served as
government collateral to pay family living or operating expenses. 25
19. Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D.N.D. 1983), 580 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.D.
1983), 580 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.D. 1984), 632 F. Supp. 997 (D.N.D. 1986), 663 F.
Supp. 1315 (D.N.D. 1987), dismissed as moot, 864 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989).
20. See 7 U.S.C. § 1985(f) (1988).
21. 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
22. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.D. 1983); Coleman v. Block, 580 F.
Supp. 194 (D.N.D. 1984).
23. Coleman v. Block, 632 F.Supp. 997, 1003 (D.N.D. 1986).
24. 7 C.F.R. § 1962 (1993).
25. Id.
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Thus, based upon an ex parte decision and seldom any statement of
reasons other than a loan delinquency, the federal government put
itself in the business of "starving out" delinquent FmHA borrowers.
As was repeatedly pointed to the federal courts during this period of
time, FmHA did not have to foreclose on these loans, it merely needed
to wait until the borrower was prepared to "voluntarily convey" or file
bankruptcy.2 6
Following the first round of the Curry/Coleman cases in 1982 to
1984, the USDA initially agreed only to recognize the impact of those
cases on a district by district basis and refused to publish regulations
implementing the 1978 statute.27 Eventually, there was a split
amongst the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal over the question
of whether the FmHA was required to implement the program
through regulations.28 Ultimately, in a Federal Register notice pub-
lished October 19, 1984, the FmHA agreed to publish nationwide reg-
ulations implementing the 1978 statute.29 At the same time, the
FmHA entered into a self-imposed period of foreclosure moratorium
while it developed its new regulations, lasting through November of
1985. During that period, virtually no liquidation or foreclosure activ-
ity was initiated by the FmHA.
When the FmHA published its new regulations in November of
1985,30 it was immediately apparent to counsel for the Coleman class
that the regulations were inadequate to protect their clients' inter-
ests.3 ' A supplemental complaint was filed in Coleman in December
of 1985 challenging the new regulations on both statutory and consti-
tutional grounds. The plaintiff class in Coleman sought a preliminary
injunction in early 1986 enjoining FmHA from proceeding with any
loan collection activity based on its new regulations; at this stage of
the litigation, the court declined to issue a wholesale injunction of
FmHA collection activities, setting the stage for several years of
chaos.32 The FmHA issued somewhere between 75,000 and 80,000
foreclosure notices under these new regulations in early 1986, then
began a process of "loan servicing" under the new regulations which
26. Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D.N.D. 1983); Coleman v. Block, 580 F.
Supp. 192, (D.N.D. 1984); Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194 (D.N.D. 1984);
Coleman v. Block, 632 F. Supp. 997 (D.N.D. 1986); Gamradt v. Block, 581 F.
Supp. 122 (D. Minn. 1983).
27. Massey, supra note 2, at 707 n.11.
28. Massey, supra note 2, at 707 n.11. In Curry v. Block, 738 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir.
1984), the Eleventh Circuit decided regulations were required. The Eighth Cir-
cuit decided they were not in Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983).
29. 49 Fed. Reg. 41,220 (1984).
30. 50 Fed. Reg. 45740 (1985).
31. See Coleman v. Block, 632 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.D. 1986).
32. Id. at 1019.
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ultimately led to 14,000 loan accelerations prior to the issuance of the
court's next injunction.
Following the government's defeat of the plaintiff's preliminary in-
junction motion in 1986, the government filed a motion for summary
judgment asking the North Dakota court to dismiss the continuing
Coleman litigation altogether. In an order issued on the government's
motion for summary judgment in 1987, however, the court again de-
clared the new agency regulations to be unconstitutional as applied,
and, in June of 1987, issued a sweeping injunction again halting all
FmHA loan liquidations and foreclosures throughout the country.3 3
At this point, the court's injunction stopped the 75,000 to 80,000 loan
liquidation proceedings, including foreclosures, and halted the govern-
ment's refusal to release security proceeds to the tens of thousands of
FmHA borrowers whose loans the government sought to accelerate. It
was estimated by the USDA that the 1987 Coleman injunction re-
sulted in approximately $1.5 billion in farm proceeds being left in the
hands of borrowers each year the injunction was in place. Eventually,
the injunction and its statutory sequel-the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 3 4-provided procedural protections and opportunities for loan
restructuring to these tens of thousands of borrowers through the late
1980s and into the early 1990s.
However, during these years of intense litigation and FmHA
gridlock, Congress became extremely concerned with the FmHA's ag-
gressive pursuit of foreclosure on the one hand, and its refusal and
inability to service loans on the other. The stage was set in 1987 for
dramatic legislative overhaul.
B. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987
Faced with both the administration's aggressive foreclosure policy,
and FmHA's inertia and gridlock in the face of litigation, Congress
enacted sweeping credit reforms in the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987.35 In that Act, Congress codified numerous elements of the Cole-
man decision-particularly the notice and appeal provisions-and re-
quired FmHA to notify each delinquent borrower of the agency that he
or she could apply for loan restructuring under the terms of the new
Act.36 The Act in turn required the FmHA to conduct what amounts
to a liquidation analysis of each delinquent loan situation in which the
borrower applies for loan restructuring.3 7 If that analysis determines
that the government's net recovery under a restructured loan, that is,
33. Coleman v. Block, 663 F. Supp. 1315, 1342 (D.N.D. 1987).
34. See Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (codified at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.
(1988)).
35. Id.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 1981d and § 2001 (1988).
37. Id. § 2001(a).
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the "net present value" of a restructured loan, would exceed the gov-
ernment's recovery through foreclosure, that is, the "net recovery
value" of the loan collateral, the statute requires the government to
restructure the loan.38 The FmHA's restructuring regulations in turn
contain a sequenced approach to loan restructuring, beginning with
an analysis of whether a deferral, rescheduling, reamortization, con-
solidation, or change of interest rates will allow a farmer to service the
debt, and ending with a program under which the government will
write off or write down unsecured debt to the point of the greater of
net recovery value of the collateral or net present value of a restruc-
tured loan.39
Although the FmHA restructuring regulations are extraordinarily
detailed and complex, and incorporate the use of a computer program
called "DALR$"4o-the software code for which takes up several
volumes of paper-the concept is quite simple and is familiar to any-
one who practices bankruptcy. However, several elements of the
FmHA analysis are different from, and better than, what is available
in bankruptcy. First, in an FmHA loan restructuring analysis under
the 1987 Act, the borrower is required only to service the debt at the
greater of the two values-net recovery value or net present value of
the restructured loan.41 Thus, the fair market value of the collateral
in this analysis is reduced, as is FmHA's ultimate "claim," to the liqui-
dation value of the collateral. This generally results in a twenty-five
to thirty-five percent discount below the fair market value of the col-
lateral. Second, FmHA borrowers are entitled to the lower of the ex-
isting contract interest rate or the present rate on the type of loan to
be restructured.42 The FmHA's interest rates have been, and con-
tinue to be, as low as five percent, substantially below market rates
that would be applied in the bankruptcy court.43 Finally, there is no
cost in an FmHA restructuring of a trustee or, in many cases, of an
attorney, resulting in the borrower's cash flow being totally dedicated
to servicing the FmHA debt. With these three fundamental differ-
ences, many FmHA borrowers can demonstrate a positive cash flow
under the FmHA program when they would be unable to service a
debt in a bankruptcy proceeding.
38. Id. § 2001(b)(4).
39. 7 C.F.R. § 1951.901-.950 (1993).
40. Id. § 1951, Subpt. S. Exh. J.
41. Id. § 1951.902(a)(2).
42. Id. § 1951.860.
43. See, e.g., USDA v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 930 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1991). See also
Susan A. Schneider, The Interaction ofAgricultural Law and Bankruptcy Law: A
Survey of Recent Cases, 68 N.D. L. REv. 309, 355 n.211 (1992).
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C. The 1990 FACT Act
The FmHA and Congress were faced with substantial criticism
when the 1987 Act was implemented. Whether by conscious ploy to
generate such criticism, or by happenstance, FmHA offices throughout
the coumtry wrote off a substantial number of fairly large loans early
in 1989 under the 1987 Act.44 Some of these large write-downs, which
exceeded $1 million, made very large headlines throughout the coun-
try. This, in turn, generated press criticism of the program and of
Congress and resulted in a backlash which expressed itself in the 1990
Farm Bill.45
Under the 1990 Farm Bill, Congress limited FmHA write-downs to
a lifetime amount of $300,000. Thus, for many FmHA borrowers who
had large loans with enormous interest accumulations since the 1970s
or early 1980s, the program became limited or irrelevant. In addition,
various elements of eligibility for loan programs were changed and
Congress mandated the agency to incorporate in its restructuring
analysis a consideration of all "available" assets of the borrower and
any co-signer. Under the 1987 Act, Congress limited the restructuring
analysis and calculation of net recovery value to looking only to the
value of the agency's collateral, and not to other unsecured assets of
the borrower.
The many changes which were incorporated in the Food, Agricul-
ture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (FACT Act) are limited to
prospective applications only. Thus, these provisions apply only to ap-
plications for FmHA loan restructuring received by the agency after
November 28, 1990, the effective date of the Act. For any applications
received prior to that date, the 1987 Act-without amendments-and
FmHA's regulations under the 1987 Act control.46 Thus, it is essential
in analyzing an FmHA borrower's situation to determine whether the
application for restructuring will be considered under the 1987 Act or
the 1990 Act.
D. FmIHA Appeals
The FmHA has a statutory obligation to provide its borrowers with
detailed notices and appeals related to any "adverse action" of the
44. See James Bovard, Don't Give Bad Farmers More Loans, NEWSDAY Oct. 2, 1989,
at 49; Judith Havermann, OMB's "High Risk List" Details Vulnerable Programs;
Management, Accounting and Procurement Weaknesses are Widespread; Billions
at Stake, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1989, at A4.
45. Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359. See Roth, Regulations Finalize It-What the ACA Giveth the FACT
Act Taketh Away, Appendix 1, (republished with permission from Farmers' Legal
Action Report, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1992, ©Farmers' Legal Action Group).
46. Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title XVIII § 1861(c), 104 Stat. 3837 (1990).
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agency.4 7 The FmHA appeal process was initially mandated by stat-
ute in 1985 and was substantially modified in the 1987 Act. All ap-
peals are conducted by the National Appeals Staff of the FmHA, a
program within, but separate from, the main administrative structure
of the FmHA. Over the past several years, there has been a great deal
of debate over the ultimate authority of FmHA decisions, and several
congressional hearings have been directed at strengthening the inde-
pendence of the FmHA appeals branch. This debate led to a provision
contained in the 1990 Farm Bill which was intended by the Congress
to reinforce that independence. 48 However, there remains substantial
administrative control over the agency by the Administrator of the
FmHA, who appoints the Director of the National Appeals Staff. Con-
gress continues to discuss new legislation which would remove the ap-
peals function from the FmHA and bring it under an entirely new
agency within the USDA which would hear appeals of FmHA, ASCS
and, perhaps, FCIC determinations.49
Under the appeal statutes and regulations, a borrower is entitled
to notice of any adverse action of the agency, the opportunity for an
informal meeting with the decision maker, and a face-to-face appeal
before a hearings officer of the National Appeals Staff. Following the
initial decision by this hearings officer, there are two levels of further
review. The borrower may elect, as an option, to have the hearings
officer's decision reviewed by the FmHA State Director. These re-
views virtually never result in a reversal of an adverse decision of the
appeal officer. As an option, or as a final stage of review after the
State Director review, the borrower can request the review of an ap-
peal decision by the Director of the National Appeals Staff. This is a
review on the record, although there does exist the possibility of sup-
plementing the appeals hearing record at this stage. It is absolutely
critical that FmHA borrowers be advised to exhaust all of their oppor-
tunities for hearings and appeals within the agency if they or their
counsel contemplate bringing an action in federal district court for ju-
dicial review of the agency's final conduct. If the borrower does not
exhaust all of these remedies, a case in federal court in virtually every
situation will be dismissed by the court for failure to exhaust.
The conduct of FmHA appeals is informal, and will be frustrating
to any trial lawyer. On the other hand, the informality of the hearing
does allow a substantial amount of latitude and flexibility in how is-
sues are approached, and provides a less expensive forum for the bor-
rower and his or her counsel than a bankruptcy proceeding or a case
in federal court. The appeals hearing also provides the opportunity to
47. 7 U.S.C. § 1983b (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 1900.51-.100 (1993).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title XVII § 1812, 104 Stat. 3821 (1990).
49. S. 3119, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)(sponsored by Senator Kent Conrad of North
Dakota).
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supplement the borrower's application for services and to argue that
changed circumstances have better enabled the farmer to service a
new loan or a restructured loan.
A large problem in the past several years, particularly during the
debate over whether the National Appeals Staff Director or the Ad-
ministrator of the FmHA has ultimate decision making authority con-
cerning appeals, has been that the FmHA has refused to implement
many appeal decisions. Such refusals have taken three forms. First,
the agency has simply "sandbagged" many decisions, ignoring the
hearing officer's determination. Second, the FmHA has initiated a
"revolving door" approach to post-appeal decision cases, requiring the
borrower to reapply, and then rejecting the borrower's application for
new reasons not previously decided by the agency. Finally, in many
cases, the Administrator simply overrode the decision of the national
appeal branch in one of two ways: secretly, by directing an outcome
through the Director of the National Appeals Staff, or overtly, through
issuance of letters. Although the issue has not been litigated in fed-
eral court, borrowers' attorneys feel very strongly that there exist sev-
eral sound legal arguments as to why FmHA is not authorized to
interfere with National Appeals Staff decisions in any of these three
ways.
This problem with the implementation of appeal decisions has led
to several congressional hearings and the introduction of Senate Bill
3119, which is currently being reshaped by Senator Conrad in the
Senate Agriculture Committee. Any borrower or borrower's attorney
faced with an FmHA refusal to implement a favorable appeal decision
should consult with knowledgeable FmHA borrowers' counsel to dis-
cuss options which will best serve the client's needs.
E. FmHA Restructuring and Bankruptcy
An interesting question which has arisen both in the FmHA regu-
lations and in the bankruptcy court is the relationship between the
FmHA restructuring provisions and the bankruptcy court. There are
several questions. First, are borrowers who have received a discharge
in Chapter 7 or confirmation in a Chapter 11 or 12 eligible for further
restructuring under the Act? Second, are borrowers who file bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 or 12 entitled to statutory benefits, such as
lower interest rates and longer amortization periods, provided by the
FmHA statutes and regulations? And, finally, what is the procedural
interrelationship between a bankruptcy proceeding and the FmHA's
complex loan restructuring procedure? That is, when a borrower files
a bankruptcy petition, may that same borrower seek restructuring
within the agency as part of the plan; and will the ensuing time
frame-often taking up to two years-be tolerated by the bankruptcy
court and somehow incorporated into the plan?
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Some of these questions have been answered; some have not.
First, in respect to the borrower who has received a discharge in a
Chapter 7, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has decided that those borrowers have no further rights to seek re-
structuring under the 1987 Act.50 The court reasoned that, once the
borrower received a personal discharge in the Chapter 7, there was no
"debt" within the meaning of the 1987 Act to restructure, and the
farmer was no longer a "borrower" under the Act.51 That decision was
challenged in the Ninth Circuit in a foreclosure case litigated in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in
1991.52 The borrower there argued that (1) the Eighth Circuit was
wrong, (2) the Ninth Circuit had adopted different judicial review
standards which would lead to a different result in this Circuit, and
(3) the United States Supreme Court had reached a contrary result in
a very similar case involving a post-Chapter 7 reorganization under
Chapter 13 (the so-called Chapter 20 case).5 3 The Eastern District of
Washington court decided to follow the Lee decision.54 One could ex-
pect, therefore, that in the State of Washington any borrower who re-
ceived a Chapter 7 discharge and who seeks judicial assistance in
obtaining further loan restructuring from FmHA would not receive
any assistance.
A different result was reached, albeit by settlement, in a recent
Oregon case.55 In that case, the borrower's plan had been confirmed
in a Chapter 11, and his property had revested before the FmHA im-
plemented the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.56 Under regulations
implementing the Act, the FmHA sent a notice in 1989 to the bor-
rower's former bankruptcy counsel, indicating that to apply for any
loan restructuring, the borrower would need to seek a modification of
the stay in the bankruptcy court, and was required to reaffirm its
FmHA debt. The borrower's former bankruptcy counsel advised the
FmHA that he was no longer representing the borrower, that the plan
had been confirmed, and that the agency should deal directly with the
borrower without regard to the bankruptcy. The FmHA refused, tak-
ing the position that once a borrower had been in the bankruptcy court
and had received a confirmed plan, the borrower's entitlement to ap-
ply for loan restructuring was altered for all time.
50. Lee v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990).
51. Id. at 1107-08.
52. United States v. Kline, Case No. CS-90-0464-WFN (E.D. Wash. 1991).
53. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 178 (1991).
54. United States v. Kline, CS-90-0464-WFN (E.D. Wash. 1991) (Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims and Motion for Summary Judgment
and Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment).
55. United States v. March Farms, Case No. 91-1101-MA (D. Or. 1991).
56. In re March Farms, No. 683-07715 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
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In this particular case, the FmHA had nonetheless conducted a
computer analysis of the debtor's FmHA's loans and concluded inter-
nally that a positive restructuring plan was possible. However, be-
cause the borrower did not formally seek to lift the stay or otherwise
follow the agency's procedures through counsel, the FmHA concluded
that the borrower was ineligible for any relief and initiated foreclo-
sure. In the ensuing litigation, the borrower challenged the FmHA's
regulations restricting the confirmed Chapter 11 borrower's rights to
apply for loan restructuring, as well as the FmHA's conduct in refus-
ing to extend a restructured loan program when the FmHA's own
analysis showed that the government would realize more through re-
structuring than it would through foreclosure. The case settled.
Finally, in regard to the question of procedural and substantive in-
terplay between the FmHA's restructuring program and bankruptcy
law, some things do appear fairly clear. First, as a practical matter,
the writer is unaware of any case in which a bankruptcy court has
delayed confirmation proceedings to allow the FmHA to go through its
lengthy administrative restructuring process. Although that is what
is contemplated by the FmHA's regulations, those regulations are so
convoluted and so inconsistent with the procedural movement of the
bankruptcy court, that it is unlikely that a bankruptcy "court would
tolerate such a procedure.57 It is also questionable as to whether the
procedure would be fair to other creditors and thus consistent with the
Bankruptcy Act. Second, numerous cases have addressed the ques-
tion of whether the borrower is entitled to the restructuring provisions
available under the Act-including subsidized interest rates, long
amortization periods, and "recovery value" as opposed to "market
value"-and have essentially taken the position that, once a borrower
has filed bankruptcy, general bankruptcy law will apply to the federal
government as it does to private creditors.58 Although this is an un-
fortunate outcome for FmHA borrowers and, arguably, one not consis-
tent with congressional intent in implementing Chapter 12 and the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, it does appear to be the law of the
land.
F. Judicial Review
FmHA borrowers may seek judicial review of final agency action
under provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.59 That Act,
which generally creates a cause of action for judicial review of final
agency action, limits such review, however, to conduct of the agency
57. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.47 (1993). See also U.S. v. March Farms, Case No. 91-1101-MA
(D. Or. 1991) (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appendix B).
58. See Schneider, supra note 43.
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
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that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accord-
ance with law."60
Although case law under the Administrative Procedures Act is le-
gion, with a fair amount relating to the FmHA, the impact of that case
law can be summed up in several rules of thumb. First, federal dis-
trict courts will not conduct a de novo review of the agency's determi-
nation. Rather, the court will generally look to the agency conduct
only on the record, except in cases where the borrower can demon-
strate that the administrative record is inadequate to present the
facts or the administrative process was unfair to the farmer.
Although there are numerous means by which the administrative rec-
ord can be explained or expanded upon, one should approach any judi-
cial review litigation with a notion that the court will be willing to look
solely to the administrative record.
Second, federal courts will not second guess the agency where Con-
gress has delegated substantial discretion to the agency and there is
thus no "law" to apply. For example, federal courts will be very reluc-
tant to review an agency determination that the borrower "lacks man-
agement ability," is "not credit-worthy," or is not a "family size farm."
Each of these elements of loan eligibility set out in the FmHA's legis-
lation and regulations relies to a certain extent upon judgment and
expertise which federal courts feel Congress has delegated to the
agency and which is not possessed by the court. On the other hand,
the court will review the agency's compliance with clear procedural
mandates and determinations. Thus, if the agency has failed to issue
a notice as required by statute and regulations, has declined to extend
the right to a hearing to a farmer, or has not calculated the value of a
restructured loan or property in accordance with the detailed regula-
tions of the agency, the court is much more likely to review the
agency's conduct against the standard set by the statute and
regulations.61
For example, in a recent case filed in the federal district court in
Washington, a dispute arose over the value of the FmHA collateral,
and ultimately the net recovery value of that collateral for purposes of
restructuring or the recovery value buyout.62 While the ultimate dis-
pute between the borrower and the agency was the value of the collat-
eral, the complaint addresses the failures by the agency to comply
with its own regulations in the valuation process.63 Thus, the bor-
60. Id. § 706.
61. RANDi ROTH, JuDiciL REvIEw OF FMHA DECISIONS, (Farmers' Legal Action
Group, ed.); Thomas P. Guarino, Reviewability of Administrative Determinations
Under 7 U.S.C. § 2001: Debt Restructuring and Loan Servicing, 1 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRuc. L. REv. 57 (1991).
62. Shane Farms v. Madigan, No. CS-92-510-WFN (E.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 1992).
63. Id.
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rower's complaint stresses that the FmHA did not properly extend to
the borrower the right to obtain an independent appraisal, and that
the agency's contract appraiser violated clear FmHA regulations and
appraisal standards in numerous respects. 64 Although the borrower
in that case does ask the federal court to conduct a valuation determi-
nation in federal court, the case in the alternative requests a remand
to the agency for proceedings consistent with agency regulations.
Thus, while a substantive issue that does involve expertise-the valu-
ation of agricultural collateral-is at the heart of the case, the pri-
mary focus of the litigation is on procedural compliance by the agency
with statutory and regulatory provisions, not on whether the agency's
ultimate appraisal figure was correct or not.
It is absolutely imperative in seeking judicial review of FmHA de-
terminations that each case be evaluated primarily in respect to
agency compliance with clear statutory and regulatory provisions, not
in respect to whether or not the borrower or his/her attorney believes
that the agency was ultimately right or wrong in a determination that
rests equally as heavily upon discretionary or judgmental factors.
G. Statute of Limitations Issues
Several recent cases have raised questions under the federal stat-
ute of limitations in connection with the government's effort to fore-
close upon or seek deficiency judgments in the case of FmHA loans.
The questions which are often raised by farmers and attorneys with
respect to statute of limitations issues, and which have arisen in these
cases, are (1) which statute of limitations applies, (2) does the statute
of limitations apply to foreclosures, and (3) what of the government's
argument that the Coleman litigation and related federal legislation
tolled the statute of limitations during the 1980s.
First, the general federal statute of limitations applies to FmHA
actions in federal court. That statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Subject to the provisions of Section 2416 of this title, and except as other-
wise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the
United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any con-
tract express of implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after
final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings
required by contract or by law, whichever is later.
(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to
establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.
6 5
64. Id.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) and (c) (1988).
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State statutes of limitations do not apply to actions brought by the
United States.6 6
The federal statute of limitations contains several sections which
can result in tolling of the statute. Section 2416 provides:
For the purpose of computing the limitations periods established in Section
2415, there shall be excluded all periods during which-
(a) the defendant or the res is outside the United States, its territories and
possessions, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; or
(b) the defendant is exempt from legal process because of infancy, mental
incompetence, diplomatic immunity, or for any other reason; or
(c) facts material to the right of action are not known and reasonably could
not be known by an official of the United States charged with the responsibil-
ity to act in the circumstances; or
(d) the United States is in a state of war declared pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. 6
7
It has been generally recognized by the courts that the existence of an
injunction which prevents maintenance or prosecution of a legal ac-
tion tolls the running of the statute of limitations under section
2416(b).68 Two recent cases have addressed this issue in connection
with FmHA collection efforts and the Coleman injunctions.
First, in United States v. Mitchell,6 9 the court held that the Cole-
man injunctions tolled the running of the statute of limitations on the
government's action to recover a money judgment against the bor-
rower.70 In Mitchell, the court held that the total tolling period result-
ing from the Coleman injunctions was 35.5 months.7 1 This period was
based upon testimony provided to the court by agents of the United
States Department of Agriculture.72
Arguably, the calculation adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp.,73
is much closer to the correct count of the tolling period under Coleman
than is the court's calculation in Mitchell. In Dos Cabezas, the appeals
court adopted the decision of the district court in the case of the same
name in which the court found that the Coleman I injunction was in
effect for a maximum period of one month, and the Coleman II injunc-
tion was in effect for a maximum period of 20.5 months. 74 The United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota also recently
66. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301 (1960); United
States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416-417 (1940). See also, Westnau Land
Corp. v. United States, 785 F. Supp. 41, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2416 (1988).
68. Hines v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.C. 1991).
69. Case No. S-92-995 (E.D. Cal. March 2, 1993).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 995 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., CIV 89-574 TUC-RMB (D. Ariz. 1991).
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held, in a yet unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Order, that the
statute of limitations had run against the FmHA in its action to collect
on an FmHA note there. 75 The court appears to have adopted the Dos
Cabezas tolling period without alteration.76
In connection with the statute of limitations issue, three other is-
sues should finally be noted. First, the statute will not start running
until the borrower has completed all loan servicing and restructuring
applications and appeals available within the agency, or has waived
the opportunity to do so during applicable time periods.77 Second, the
statute, by its own terms, does not apply to actions brought by the
government "to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or
personal property."7 8 The federal courts have been unanimous in de-
claring that this provision applies specifically to foreclosure actions
and that such actions, to the extent they seek only foreclosure of real
property serving as collateral for FmHA loans, are not subject to the
six year limitation.79 Third, both the Mitchell and Dos Cabezas cases
recognize that any period of time during which a bankruptcy stay was
in effect would also be counted as a tolling period for purposes of calcu-
lating the statute of limitations.8 0
Any practitioner looking at the statute of limitations issue in con-
nection with an FmHA action to recover on a promissory note should
look very carefully at the cases cited above.
H. Summary Regarding FmHA
Farmers Home Administration procedures have evolved over sev-
eral decades. They are procedurally intricate, complex, and volumi-
nous. Any borrower or borrower's attorney must become educated
concerning the FmHA procedures if the full benefit of available FmHA
programs and resources is to be obtained. The agency itself cannot be
relied upon to fairly, completely, or properly implement its proce-
dures. This inadequacy results from numerous factors, including un-
derstaffing, executive branch policy and bias over the past twelve
years, complexity and rapidity of change, and simple agency inertia.
In many instances, it has also resulted from hostile relationships
which have developed between borrowers and FmHA personnel at the
local level. In the end, attorneys for FmHA borrowers faced with a
loan delinquency and credit restructuring problem must either plow
75. United States v. Feeney, CIV 92-3012 (S.D. Aug. 25, 1993) (Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order).
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
78. Id. § 2415(c).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 985 F.2d. 500 (10th Cir. 1993).
80. United States v. Dos Cabezas, 995 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Mitchell, No. S-92-995 DFL/JFM (E.D. Cal. March 2, 1993).
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through voluminous materials to learn the FmHA programs, or must
be prepared to engage consulting counsel or loan restructuring exper-
tise to assure that the FmHA borrower's situation is adequately
handled.
III. FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
As noted at the outset, the Farm Credit System today derives from
the same historical federal involvement in agriculture as does Farm-
ers Home Administration. That derivation, and the fact that both
lenders focus their attention on farmers and ranchers, exhausts the
similarity between the programs. The Farm Credit System today,
with the exception of the "bailout" granted by the Congress in the
1987 Act, functions with funds raised privately and lent to members
through agricultural lending cooperatives-the "Farm Credit Serv-
ices" offices as they are known today.8 1 The Farm Credit System pre-
viously consisted of Production Credit Associations, Federal Land
Banks, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, District Federal Land
Banks and Banks for Cooperatives.8 2 For decades, these lending in-
stitutions-all borrower owned cooperatives-operated on a regional
basis under the auspices of twelve districts.83 The districts and local
lenders, in turn, were regulated by the Farm Credit Administration,
an executive agency of the United States government.8 4 For reasons
similar to those affecting the FmHA in the 1980s, however, Congress
dramatically overhauled the Farm Credit System in several stages,
culminating in the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.85 While the scope
of the overhaul and the mechanism of the "bailout" which accompa-
nied that overhaul are far beyond the scope of this Article and discus-
sion, it is important that FCS borrowers and their attorneys are aware
of some of this history as they approach Farm Credit System cases.
As with the FmHA, this history shapes a great deal of the conduct of
the FCS lenders today.
In the early 1980s, the Farm Credit Administration began a very
intrusive and aggressive regulatory role within district Farm Credit
Banks around the country. For example, regulators from the Farm
Credit System took over and overrode functions of Spokane district
81. See Christopher R. Kelly & Barbara J. Hoekstra, A Guide to Borrower Litigation
Against the Farm Credit System and the Rights of Farm Credit System Borrow-
ers, 66 N.D. L. REv. 127 (1990); James T. Massey, Farm Credit System: Structure
and Financing Under the New Act, Vol. 3, No. 1, Farmers' Legal Action Report,
January/February 1988; James T. Massey & Susan A. Schneider, Title I of the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987: A Law in Search of Enforcement, 23 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 589 (1990).
82. HALCROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 260.
83. HALCROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 258-59.
84. HALcROW ET AL. supra note 1, at 258-59.
85. HALcRow ET AL., supra note 1, at 259-60; P.L. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1987).
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bank examiners in the early 1980s and liquidated several Production
Credit Associations within the Spokane district.8 6 These liquidations,
in turn, led to litigation concerning the scope of the Farm Credit Ad-
ministration's (FCA) role, and particularly the means by which it car-
ried out its function.8 7 This intrusive conduct by the FCA also led to a
reaction among local FCS lenders and their borrowers concerning the
proper role of the federal government in the system.
At the same time, the Farm Credit System began experiencing a
great deal of financial difficulty which paralleled the financial difficul-
ties of its borrowers. At one time, it was estimated that the system
was carrying tens of billions of dollars of unsecured and unserviceable
debt,88 although there was great debate during the 1980s as to what
that amount actually was. As a result of that debt and, again, of exec-
utive branch policy, the Farm Credit System began in the 1980s to
liquidate and foreclose on tens of thousands of its loans. These liqui-
dations, in turn, led to a political backlash similar to that accompany-
ing the FmHA's conduct. Thus, Congress enacted in both 1985 and
1987 new provisions that were intended to protect borrowers' rights
within the system.8 9
Although these borrowers' rights seemed to parallel the FmHA
provisions, they have met with a sorry fate in implementation. When
Congress enacted them in 1985 and 1987, it failed to specifically ad-
dress the question of whether FCS borrowers had a private right of
action through which these new borrowers' rights could be enforced in
court. As a result, Farm Credit System lenders throughout the coun-
try took the position that these so-called borrowers' rights were
merely advisory, not enforceable, and did not take them very seri-
ously. This position led to a series of lawsuits which have ultimately
determined that the borrowers' rights provisions contained in the fed-
eral legislation and the Farm Credit System regulations are virtually
unenforceable by system borrowers. 90
A. The Borrowers' Rights Provisions
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 consolidated and added to a
list of so-called "borrowers' rights," some of which had been initially
enacted by Congress in 1985. These borrower protections under the
Act are:
86. KENNETH L. PEOPLES ET AL., ANATOMY OF AN AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL CRISIS,
129-40 (1992).
87. VanLeeuwen v. Farm Credit Administration, 577 F. Supp. 264 (D. Or. 1983).
88. HALCROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 257-58.
89. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
90. See infra section III.B.
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1. If the borrower applies, FCS lenders must consider restructur-
ing distressed loans. Until restructuring is considered, lenders are re-
stricted from continuing or initiating certain foreclosures. 9 1
2. All nonaccrual loans held by FCS lenders receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance must be considered for restructuring.9 2
3. FCS lenders must provide borrowers with extensive loan infor-
mation prior to loan closing and with copies of appraisals.9 3
4. Lenders must give written notice to borrowers of any action
taken on a loan application or loan restructuring.9 4
5. Borrowers are entitled to have a Credit Review Committee re-
view an adverse action taken on a loan application or a request for
restructuring.9 5
6. Borrowers may request additional appraisals to support re-
views of loan denials or reductions.96
7. Lenders may not foreclose on loans that are current. Lenders
may demand additional collateral in only very narrow
circumstances.9 7
8. Once a loan is current, lenders may not accelerate a borrower's
loans for past delinquency.9 8
9. Lenders must notify borrowers if their loans are placed in
nonaccrual status. 99
10. Borrowers have the right of first refusal to lease or repur-
chase any real estate acquired from them by a lender.lOO
11. In general, FCS must retire borrowers' stock at par value.' 0 1
12. Upon request of the borrower, lenders must review interest
rates being paid to determine if they are proper. 0 2
13. FCS lenders must release any documents singed by the bor-
rower.' 0 3Today, these borrower protections are contained in the Farm
Credit System regulationslO4 and are the law of the land of Farm
Credit System lenders. However, the litigation referred to above has
reduced these borrower protections to virtual nonsense.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2202a(b)(3), 2202a(d)(1) (1988).
92. Id. § 2202c(a).
93. See id. §§ 2199, 2202(d)(3).
94. Id. § 2201.
95. Id. § 2202(b).
96. Id. § 2202(d).
97. Id. § 2202d(a). See, e.g., id. § 2202a(j)(protecting lenders against loss of
collateral).
98. Id. § 2202d(c).
99. Id. § 2202d(d)(1).
100. Id. § 2219a(a).
101. Id. § 2162(a).
102. Id. § 2199(b).
103. Id. § 2200.
104. 12 C.F.R. 614.4336 (1993).
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B. Harper and Subsequent Cases
In early 1988, when the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 became the
law, the Federal Land Bank of Spokane decided that borrowers whose
loans had already been foreclosed, but who still remained in posses-
sion of and occupying the property, were not eligible for restructuring
under the provisions of the new Act. This decision led to litigation in
the United States District for Oregon. There, in Harper v. Federal
Land Bank of Spokane,105 Chief Judge Owen Panner determined that,
although Congress did not include an express private right of action
for FCS borrowers which would enable them to enforce provisions of
the Act, Congress nonetheless implied a private right of action since it
was concerned with correcting abuses of borrowers' rights which had
been reported throughout the country.O6 The Land Bank appealed
this decision, however, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit panel held that Congress
did not intend to allow borrowers to enforce the borrower protections
through an implied private right of action, and that the sole remedy, if
there was one, was contained in the very vague and unimplemented
provisions of the Act concerning review and enforcement by the Farm
Credit Administration.107 The Harper case has been followed by deci-
sions in the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, as well as state courts
throughout the country.10 8 Thus, as this is written, the borrower pro-
105. 692 F. Supp. 1244, (D. Or. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1057 (1990).
106. Id. at 1247.
107. Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1057 (1990).
108. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 909 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1990)(enbanc)(no
implied cause of action); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22
(10th Cir. 1990)(no implied cause of action); Walker v. Federal Land Bank of St.
Louis, 726 F. Supp. 211 (C.D. Ill. 1989)(no implied cause of action); Renick Bros.,
Inc. v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Dodge City, 721 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Kan.
1989)(no implied cause of action); Stoppel v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, No.
89-1221-C 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11642, (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1989)(no implied
cause of action, relying onRenick); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ochs, No. 87-
4113-R 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079 (D. Kan. July 12, 1989)(no implied cause of
action); Wilson v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, No. 88-4058-R (1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1558)(D. Kan. Jan. 30, 1989)(no implied cause of action); In re Reilly, 105
Bankr. 59 (Bankr D. Mont. 1989)(no implied cause of action); Neth v. Federal
Bank of Jackson, 717 F. Supp. 1478 (S.D. Ala. 1988)(no implied cause of action).
But see In re Jarrett Ranches, Inc., 107 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989)(finding
an implied cause of action); Martinson v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 725 F.
Supp. 469 (D.N.D. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5202 (8th Cir. May 5,
1989)(finding an implied cause of action); Leckband v. Naylor, 715 F. Supp. 1451
(D. Minn. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5301 (8th Cir. June 8, 1989)(finding an
implied cause of action). See also Payne v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 711
F. Supp. 851 (W.D. N.C. 1989)(implicitly finding an implied cause of action); In re
Hilton Land & Cattle Co., 101 Bankr. 604 (D. Neb. 1989)(implicitly finding an
implied cause of action); Meredith v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 690 F.
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tections provided to Farm Credit System borrowers do not play much
of a role in FCS restructuring determinations.
C. The Restructuring Process
Despite the ineffectiveness of these borrower protections, however,
FCS lenders do provide their borrowers with notice and the opportu-
nity to apply for restructuring in the case of delinquent loans. For
example, in some cases, the Federal Land Bank of Spokane has turned
from an aggressive foreclosure policy toward a more reasonable ap-
proach, seeking to balance the interest of the bank and its sharehold-
ers with those of individual members facing financial difficulty. The
bank has indicated more willingness to discuss restructuring-
whether in the context of the formal notice or informal negotiations-
and to avoid litigation and bankruptcy proceedings where possible.
Although this willingness may not generally be the rule throughout
the district, and may depend upon individual cases and representa-
tion, it does represent a change of attitude from that of the early
1980s.
Although the formal restructuring mechanism under the Act is es-
sentially unenforceable through direct litigation by an FCS borrower
in most circuits, it is important that the borrower pursue all adminis-
trative remedies provided under the Act and FCS regulations. It is
not yet certain in many states, including Oregon and Washington,
whether, in spite of Harper, a borrower can raise a failure by an FCS
lender to comply with its own regulations as an affirmative, equitable
defense to foreclosure.' 0 9 Surely, if the borrower has failed to seek all
available administrative remedies from the bank during the pre-fore-
closure proceedings, a court would be reluctant to find that the bor-
rower had acted in good faith sufficient to invoke the court's equity to
stop the foreclosure. Any attorney representing a borrower in an FCS
foreclosure should evaluate whether the bank has complied with the
Supp. 786 (E.D. Ark. 1988)(implicitly finding an implied cause of action), aff'd,
873 F.2d 1447 (8th Cir. 1989).
For a brief period, the Eighth Circuit recognized an implied cause of action.
Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 887 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated on
grant of reh'g en banc, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18809 (8th Cir. 1989)(finding an
implied cause of action). Before that decision was vacated, it was followed by at
least one district court in the Eighth Circuit. Hill v. Farm Credit Bank of St.
Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
At least two courts have recently considered whether there is an implied cause
of action to remedy violations of regulations promulgated under the Farm Credit
Act, as amended. Williams v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 729 F. Supp. 1387
(D.D.C. 1990)(finding no implied cause of action); Winkel v. Production Credit
Ass'n of East Central Wisconsin, 451 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)(finding no
implied cause of action and apparently considering the 1987 Act).
109. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (N.D.
1988); Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 446 (N.D. 1987).
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regulations, with its own restructuring procedures, and with the Act,
and should look at several cases which lay out the framework for as-
sertion of an equitable defense to foreclosure.11o Although these cases
seem conceptually indistinguishable from those in which the borrower
initiates an action to enforce a restructuring regulation or require-
ment, the courts have recognized a distinction and have acknowledged
that the affirmative, equitable use of FCS violations of restructuring
provisions and regulations may be actionable even where a private
right of action does not exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
Representation of financially distressed agricultural producers
within the Farmers Home Administration or Farm Credit System can
be challenging, difficult, and frustrating. However, such representa-
tion, particularly of FmHA borrowers, can also be productive and re-
warding to the borrower, and may avoid the cost and stigma of a
bankruptcy. Many farms and ranches have literally been saved
through use of the FmHA procedures and negotiation with FCS lend-
ers within their regulatory context. To be successful in either arena,
however, the farm credit attorney must be fully educated about his or
her client's options and must understand the regulations, how they fit
into the overall scheme of the lender, and particularly, the remedies
that are available if the negotiations or administrative procedures fail.
110. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (N.D.
1988); Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 446 (N.D. 1987).
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